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An Analysis of the Sixth Amendment Right
to Counsel as It Applies to Suspended
Sentences and Probation: Do Argersinger




The notions of a fair trial and due process of law are cornerstones to
the concept of criminal justice in American society.1 An important
aspect of these notions is the guarantee of the effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal prosecution.2 The Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides that, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense."3 At first blush, the plain language appears to support the idea
that counsel must be present in all criminal prosecutions. The Supreme
Court, however, has held that this is so only the case where an accused is
actually imprisoned.4 This right, so fundamental to the American
criminal justice system, was established as a result of controversial
English common law that existed at the time the Constitution was
adopted.5
English common law provided no absolute right to counsel in all
* J.D. Candidate, Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2003. This comment is dedicated in memory of my father David B. Young, whose
approval and encouragement continues to be my motivation to succeed. The author
would like to thank his family and Laura E. Russell for their continuing support and
involvement, and Quin M. Sorenson for his editorial criticisms and commendations.
1. Laurie S. Fulton, Note, The Right to Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 26
AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1599, 1599 (1989).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
5. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
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criminal proceedings.6 A person accused of a felony was denied the
assistance of counsel, whereas individuals charged with treason, a
misdemeanor offense, or involved in civil litigation were entitled to full
assistance of counsel.7 In fact, Parliament did not pass a law granting all
individuals accused of felonies the right to assistance of counsel until
1836.
This common law rule providing assistance of counsel in petty
offenses and civil litigation while denying that right to a person charged
with a grave offense was highly criticized by English statesmen and
lawyers. 9 The drafters of the Constitution recognized the importance of
extending the assistance of counsel beyond the common law rule.' 0 It is
fair to say, then, that the recognition of the right to assistance of counsel
by the American colonies arose from the dislike for the English common
law rule.
The right to counsel in the United States originally encompassed
only to the right to retain counsel." Over time, judicial interpretations of
this right expanded to require the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants in state and federal felony prosecutions.' 2 In Argersinger v.
Hamlin,'3 the right was interpreted to apply not only to state and federal
felony cases, but also to misdemeanors. Under the rule announced in
Scott v. Illinois,14 however, the United States Supreme Court refined its
previous holding in Argersinger and held that the right to counsel for
indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases applies only in cases where an
accused receives a sentence of "actual imprisonment.'
15




9. See id. Criticism of this rule is seen in William Blackstone's remark: "For upon
what face of reason ... can the assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is
allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?" Id. at 60-61 (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *355).
10. Id. at 64-65. Twelve of the thirteen original colonies rejected the English rule of
granting counsel only in misdemeanor and treason cases, and recognized the right in all
criminal prosecutions.
11. See Fulton, supra note 1, at 1604.
12. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
From the very beginning, our state and national Constitutions and laws have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
Id.
13. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
14. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
15. Id. at 373-74.
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criminal prosecutions where the defendant is "actually imprisoned."
Although Scott and its predecessors seemed to afford indigent defendants
sufficient safeguards, the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel have been seriously curtailed by the United States Supreme
Court's rigid adherence to the judicially created "actual imprisonment"
standard. First, lower courts have had trouble interpreting what exactly
constitutes a term of imprisonment.' 6 Second, Supreme Court precedent
leaves open the possibility that a criminal defendant may be actually
imprisoned without the assistance of counsel. 7
This comment will argue that those courts interpreting Argersinger
and Scott as drawing a definite line of Sixth Amendment protection at
actual imprisonment undermine the protections afforded a criminal
defendant and, further, the "actual imprisonment" standard has proven
difficult to define and apply. Ultimately, this comment will conclude
that the only logical way out of this judicially created Sixth Amendment
quagmire is to raise the constitutional minimum protection and require
appointment of counsel in all criminal proceedings where imprisonment
is an authorized penalty.
Part II discusses the background and development of the
constitutional right to counsel in both felony and misdemeanor cases.
Part III examines how the lower courts have interpreted and applied the
actual imprisonment standard to suspended sentences and sentences of
conditional probation and further analyzes the driving thrust behind
16. See Ex parte Shelton, No. 1990031, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 209, at *9 (May 19,
2000), affd, Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002). Some federal and state courts
have interpreted Argersinger and Scott to mean that a defendant who is denied assistance
of counsel and convicted of a misdemeanor offense resulting in a suspended sentence or
probation does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel because the defendant
was not "actually imprisoned." Id.; see United States v. Smith, 56 F.3d 66 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1991); Cottle v. Wainwright,
477 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S. 895 (1973); United States v. Nash, 703
F. Supp. 507 (W.D. La. 1989), aft'd, 886 F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989); People v.
Reichenbach, 587 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1998); State v. Hansen, 903 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1995);
State v. Sanchez, 612 P.2d 1332 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Layton City v. Longcrier, 943
P.2d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Griswold v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1996).
Still other courts have held that an indigent defendant who receives a conditionally
suspended sentence or probation without the assistance of counsel is constitutionally
entitled to representation because that defendant has been "sentenced to a term of
imprisonment." See United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Foster, 904 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sultani, 704 F.2d 132 (4th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
White, 529 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1976).
17. Nash, 703 F. Supp. 507. Without the assistance of counsel, the defendant in
Nash received a sentence of probation. He was imprisoned later for violating the
conditions of the probation. The court held that the term of imprisonment was not the
result of the prior conviction, obtained without the assistance of counsel, but, rather, was
the result of the violation of the conditions of probation. Id. at 510.
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Argersinger and Scott, which is not confined to just actual imprisonment.
This part also discusses some of the economic factors involved in
amending the current state of the law to apply to all criminal
prosecutions where imprisonment is authorized. Part IV concludes that
the protections of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be applied
to all criminal proceedings where imprisonment is an authorized penalty.
II. Background
A. Right to Counsel in Felony Cases
In 1932, the Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama1 8 that a
defendant might have a fundamental right to appointed counsel under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 19  In an
interesting twist, the Court based its decision on the Fourteenth
Amendment, and not on the Sixth Amendment.20 Rather than extend the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court chose to hold that, in capital cases, the right to
counsel is a fundamental right mandated by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 The Court reasoned that the right to be
heard would be "of little or no avail if it did not comprehend the right to
be heard by counsel.,
22
In Powell, the defendants were four indigent black youths who
faced death sentences for the rape of two white girls. The Court stated
that, under the circumstances, "the necessity of counsel was so vital and
imperative" that failure to appoint counsel was a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.23 Nevertheless, the holding in Powell was
narrowed to its facts and thus did not specifically extend the right to
24counsel to encompass defendants in all criminal prosecutions.
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
19. Id. at 71.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 72-73.
22. Id. at 68-69. The Court recognized that court-appointed counsel was necessary
in a capital case in which the defendant was unable to employ counsel and was incapable
of adequately defending himself because of "ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy or
the like." Id. at 71. The Court also stated that "even the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of the law .... He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." Id. at 69.
23. Id. at 71. Factors that the Court applied in reaching its decision included the
ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public
hostility, the imprisonment and close surveillance of the defendants by the military
forces, the fact that their friends and families were all in other states and communication
with them necessarily difficult, and above all the fact that they stood in deadly peril of
their lives. Id.
24. Id. "Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other
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Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,25 the Court expanded the right
to counsel by applying the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel to
indigent defendants in all federal felony trials rather than just capital
cases. 26 In Johnson, the defendants were tried and convicted by a federal
district court for "possessing and uttering" counterfeit money. The
defendants claimed that they had been denied their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in the federal trial court proceeding. 28 The defendants
were then held in isolation for sixteen days, after which they filed an
application for appeal,29 which was denied because it was filed too late.3°
The defendants then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as this was
the only possible remedy available to remedy a violation of their
constitutional rights. 3' The Supreme Court stated that, although habeas
relief is not to be used as a writ of error, it might be used as a
constitutional safeguard where no other avenue of recourse exists.
32
Accordingly, the Court held that, absent a finding on remand that the
defendants knowingly and intelligently waived their right to counsel, the
federal district court will be without jurisdiction because it denied
defendants their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.33 The Court
ultimately concluded that, in all criminal cases in federal court, the Sixth
Amendment mandates the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants.34
In 1942, the Supreme Court in Betts v. Brady35 held that the right to
circumstances, we need not determine." Id.
25. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
26. Id. at 468 (holding that, if the accused has no representation and has not
competently and intelligently waived the right to counsel, then the Sixth Amendment bars
deprivation of life or liberty).
27. Id. at 459.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 462.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 467.
Petitioner, convicted and sentenced without the assistance of counsel, contends
that he was ignorant of his right to counsel, and incapable of preserving his
legal and constitutional rights during trial. Urging that-after conviction-he
was unable to obtain a lawyer; was ignorant of the proceedings to obtain new
trial or appeal and the time limits governing both; and that he did not possess
the requisite skill or knowledge properly to conduct an appeal, he says that it
was-as a practical matter-impossible for him to obtain relief by appeal. If
these contentions be true in fact, it necessarily follows that no legal procedural
remedy is available to grant relief for a violation of constitutional rights, unless
the courts protect petitioner's rights by habeas corpus.
Id.
32. Id. at 465-67.
33. Id. at 469.
34. Id. at 462-63.
35. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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counsel was not a fundamental right in all criminal proceedings and,
accordingly, not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.36 In Betts, a Maryland trial court convicted the defendant
of robbery without providing counsel for the defendant to assist in his
defense.37 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the
denial of counsel in Betts was not so "offensive to common and
fundamental ideas of fairness" as to constitute a violation of due
process. 38 The Court concluded that the denial of appointed counsel to
an indigent defendant ih a state-court proceeding did not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39  Instead, the Court
stated that the determination of whether to appoint counsel requires a
case-by-case "appraisal of the totality of facts" to determine whether
failure to appoint counsel is a denial of fundamental fairness.40
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court in Gideon v.
Wainwright4' overruled Betts and held that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to protect indigent defendants' Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in all felony cases.42 The Court reverted to the prior Powell
notion that the right to counsel is "fundamental and essential to a fair
trial. ' ' 3 In Gideon, the defendant was charged with a felony for breaking
and entering a poolroom with the intent to commit a misdemeanor.44 The
state court denied the defendant's request for counsel, stating that under
Florida law a court can appoint counsel only to a person charged with a
capital offense. 45 Gideon proceeded without the assistance of counsel,
46and was subsequently convicted of the crime.
In concluding that the guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right,
36. Id. at 471.
37. Id. at 456-57.
38. Id. at 473.
39. Id. at 471-72.
40. Id. at 462.
Due process of law is secured against invasion by the federal Government by
the Fifth Amendment, and is safeguarded against state action in identical words
by the Fourteenth. The phrase formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid
than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of
Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested
by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one
setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations, fall short of such denial.
Id.
41. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42. Id. at 342-45.
43. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73; see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-46.
44. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336.
45. Id. at 337.
46. Id.
[Vol. 107:3
2003] ANALYSIS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 705
the Court stated that attorneys in criminal court "are necessities, not
luxuries."4 7 Further, the Court recognized that "any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him.' ,48 The Court also reasoned that "the
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours."
49
B Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases
In the years following Gideon, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel stood as a fundamental right for the criminally accused to have
the assistance of counsel present at all stages of a federal or state felony
proceeding through incorporation of the Sixth Amendment through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 50 Further, because
Gideon once again deemed this right fundamental by overruling Betts,
absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of this right, an indigent
defendant is entitled to court appointed counsel, and to have such counsel
present at all stages of a federal or state felony proceeding.
Until 1972, the Supreme Court refused to address the issue of the
right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.51  In 1972, in the landmark
decision of Argersinger v. Hamlin,52 the United States Supreme Court
finally took the opportunity to address the issue of whether the
fundamental right to counsel applies to misdemeanor cases.53  In
Argersinger, the Court held that the fundamental right to counsel
attached to all criminal prosecutions, including misdemeanors, in which
an "accused is deprived of his liberty."
54
In Argersinger, the defendant was charged with carrying a
concealed weapon, an offense punishable by up to six months
47. Id. at 344.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 340-42.
51. For a list of cases in which the Supreme Court refused to address the issue of
whether the "fundamental right" to counsel applies to misdemeanor cases, see David S.
Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions After Scott and
Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 517, 523 n. 27 (1982).
52. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 32. The Court stated its concern for a defendant accused of a misdemeanor
because of the nature of the workings of the American court system. The judges that hear
misdemeanor cases, and the lawyers that prosecute and defend misdemeanants, are
burdened with an overbearing workload. This results in "assembly-line justice," where
defendants are pushed through the court system, thus prejudicing the defendant, who may
be imprisoned without receiving an adequate defense. Id. at 34-36.
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imprisonment, a $1,000 fine, or both. 5 The trial was before a judge, and
the defendant did not have the assistance of counsel.56 He was sentenced
to a term of ninety-days imprisonment. 57 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision, finding that the defendant was denied his
due process right to a fair trial because he was not afforded counsel.5 8
The Court reasoned that, because the punishment of imprisonment is so
severe, a defendant could not have a fair trial without counsel present.
59
The Court concluded that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel, imprisonment for any misdemeanor or felony offense is
impermissible unless the defendant had the assistance of counsel at
trial.6 °
Thus, after Argersinger, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
protects the criminally accused in all federal and state felony and
misdemeanor proceedings where the defendant will actually be deprived
of his or her liberty. 6' However, this leaves open a significant question
that the Court refused to address: whether the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies to a defendant who is charged with a crime where
imprisonment is authorized, but not actually imposed. The Court did not
address this issue because, in Argersinger, the defendant was actually
62
sent to prison.
The United States Supreme Court, in an attempt to clarify its
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 36-37.
59. Id. at 37 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970)). "[T]he prospect
of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a
trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his
career and his reputation." Id.
60. Id. at 36-37. The Court gave several reasons why a misdemeanor conviction
could be just as serious as a felony conviction and thus were entitled the same
constitutional protections. First, the legal and constitutional questions raised in a case
that leads to brief imprisonment are not necessarily less complex than a case that may
send a person to prison for six months or more. Second, defendants often need counsel to
advise them on all possible ramifications of a guilty plea in both felony and misdemeanor
cases. Finally, the misdemeanor court is characterized by "assembly-line justice." Id. at
33-36.
61. Id. at 37-38. The Court expressly stated agreement with the Supreme Court of
Oregon's decision in Stevenson v. Holzman, 458 P.2d 414,418 (Ore. 1969):
We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been denied the
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This holding is
applicable to all criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations of
municipal ordinances. The denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the
imposition of a jail sentence.
Id.; see Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37-38.
62. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36-37. "We need not consider the requirements of the
Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved,
however, for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail." Id.
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Argersinger decision, addressed this question several years later in Scott
v. Illinois.63 The Scott decision reaffirmed the "actual imprisonment"
standard set forth in Argersinger, and clarified that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel extends only to misdemeanor convictions that "actually
lead[] to imprisonment."
64
In Scott, the defendant was convicted of shoplifting and fined $50.65
However, the applicable Illinois statute authorized a maximum penalty of
$500, one year in jail, or both.66 In affirming the conviction, the Court
essentially followed the rationale of Argersinger.6  The Court further
reasoned that extending the interpretation of deprivation of liberty
beyond "actual imprisonment" would create great confusion and impose
unpredictable and substantial costs on the fifty states.68 Thus, based
upon the facts of Scott, the Court was not prepared to equate a $50 fine
with a deprivation of liberty mandating the assistance of counsel.
III. Analysis
A. Application of the "Actual Imprisonment" Standard Is Not Uniform
Among Lower Courts
Within the facts of Scott, the Supreme Court was able to answer the
question of whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to a
defendant who is charged with a crime where imprisonment is a possible
punishment, but is not actually imposed. The defendant in Scott was
only fined, and, therefore, according to the Supreme Court, suffered no
loss of liberty. In application, however, the "actual imprisonment"
standard has often proven illogical to the point of nullity given the
workings of the American criminal justice system.
LeReed Shelton was found guilty of third degree assault, a
misdemeanor offense, after appearing pro se before an Alabama trial
court.69 The court gave Shelton a thirty-day suspended sentence and
63. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
64. Id. at 373 (citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33).
65. Id. at 368.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 373. "[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of
imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the
line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel." Id.
68. See id. "Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension
would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50
quite diverse States." Id.
69. Shelton v. State, No. CR-97-1313, 1999 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 128, at *1 (May
28, 1999), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, No. 1990031, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 209 (May 19,
2000), aff'd, Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002).
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placed him on unsupervised probation for two years.70 As a condition of
his probation, the court ordered Shelton to pay a $500 fine, court costs,
and $516.69 in restitution.71
On October 2, 1998, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals held
that "the constitutional right to counsel applies in misdemeanor cases
where the appellant's sentence of imprisonment is suspended
conditionally." The case was remanded to the trial court to determine
whether defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
his right to counsel.72 On remand, the trial court found that the defendant
did not explicitly waive his right to counsel, that he "understood his right
to employ counsel," and that he "did a credible job of defending his own
case."
73
After resubmission of the case, the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed its previous decision and concluded that a
misdemeanor defendant was not constitutionally entitled to appointed
counsel upon receipt of a suspended sentence.74 The court reviewed
previous Alabama court interpretations of Argersinger and Scott, and
expressly overruled two Alabama cases, 75 which "[held] that a
conditionally suspended sentence of imprisonment could not be imposed
on an indigent defendant who had been denied counsel.,
76
Shelton then filed in the Alabama Supreme Court a petition for writ
of certiorari, which was granted.77 The court determined that neither
Argersinger nor Scott addressed the issue of whether probation or a
suspended sentence constitutes actual imprisonment.78 The Alabama
Supreme Court concluded that a conditional threat of imprisonment
imposed in an uncounseled misdemeanor case "could never be carried
out" and, thus, was "invalid" as a matter of federal constitutional law.
79
Lerone D. Nash was arrested on July 26, 1987, at Barksdale Air
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *2-3.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *3.
75. Culberson v. State, 709 So. 2d 1327 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Williams v. City of
Phenix City, 659 So. 2d 1004 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
76. Shelton, 1999 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 128, at *6-9 (citing Jowers v. City of
Selma, 688 So. 2d 278 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)).
77. Exparte Shelton, No. 1990031, 2000 Ala. LEXIS 209, at *4-5 (May 19, 2000),
aff'd, Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002).
78. Id. at *9.
79. Id. at * 11. Relying on the reasoning of United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648
(10th Cir. 1991), and language in Scott that "no indigent criminal defendant [can] be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment" absent the assistance of counsel, the Alabama
Supreme Court ruled that Shelton "was entitled to representation by counsel because he
was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, albeit suspended." Id.; see also Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979).
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Force Base and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI). 80 This
was Nash's first DWI offense. 8' Nash appeared pro se and was advised
of his constitutional right to have counsel present during the
proceedings.8 2 The court made note of the fact that the trial transcript
showed "no audible response" by Nash when asked whether he gave up
his constitutional right to counsel, but that the record was clear that he
was given a full explanation of these rights and told that a plea of guilty
would waive them.83 Nash pled guilty and was ordered to pay a fine of
$400 and a special assessment of $25 to the Crime Victims Fund. In
addition to fines, Nash was given a six-month suspended sentence and
84
the placed on supervised conditional probation for one year.
Nash subsequently violated certain conditions of his probation, and
was arrested.85 A probation revocation hearing was held on September 2,
1988, before a United States magistrate, before whom Nash was
represented by counsel.8 6  Having found that the defendant failed to
comply with the conditions of his probation, the court ordered the
revocation of the original six-month suspended sentence, and sentenced
Nash to ninety-days imprisonment.87
On appeal, the United States District Court stressed a literal reading
of the term "actual imprisonment" in Argersinger and Scott.88 The court
concluded that Nash was not imprisoned for his original DWI offense,
but rather for his unwillingness to comply with the conditions of his
probation. 89 Furthermore, the court stated that courts must retain the
right to enforce their penalties, whether they are fines or conditional
probation.90
Therefore, it appears that lower courts are applying the holdings of
Argersinger and Scott quite differently. Those courts that have
interpreted Argersinger and Scott as applying generally to deprivations
80. United States v. Nash, 703 F. Supp 507, 508 (W.D. La. 1989), aftd, 886 F.2d








88. Id. at 510 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)). These cases generally state that, absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, individuals may not be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless they were represented by counsel. Scott, 440
U.S. at 373-74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. Scott makes it clear that "actual
imprisonment" is the constitutional line defining an accused person's right to counsel.
See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74.
89. See Nash, 703 F. Supp. at 510.
90. Id.
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of liberty have raised the constitutional floor of Sixth Amendment
protection to apply to suspended sentences and probation. Obviously,
these courts have observed the inherent flaw in applying literal meaning
to "actual imprisonment" as it applies to suspended sentences and
conditional probated sentences. It is a nullity to give a suspended
sentence or conditional sentence of probation to an uncounseled
misdemeanant, because a court can never revoke such a sentence and
imprison the defendant without offending the constitutional rights of the
defendant as stated in Argersinger and Scott.91
Nevertheless, other courts have given literal interpretation to
Argersinger and Scott as requiring constitutional protection only where
the defendant is put in prison or jail.92 These courts allow suspended
sentences and conditional sentences of probation for uncounseled
misdemeanors by stating that any subsequent imprisonment is the result
of a violation of the conditions of the probation or suspended sentence,
and not imprisonment for the original offense. These courts circumvent
the constitutional requirement that no person can be imprisoned without
the assistance of counsel by simply removing the sentence of
imprisonment to a later date.
These courts fail to recognize that the uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction led to the imposition of the suspended sentence. 93 If a court
imprisons a defendant for violating the conditions of such a suspended
sentence stating that the "actual imprisonment" was for violating
conditions of probation, the fact remains that, but for the uncounseled
misdemeanor, there would be no "actual imprisonment., 94  Allowing
courts to imprison defendants without the assistance of counsel simply
by removing in time the imprisonment is no more constitutional than
imprisoning the defendant immediately after trial.
Unquestionably, however, the authority of the granting court to
revoke the suspended sentence and incarcerate the defendant if certain
conditions of the probation are not met is a necessary part of the
probation process. Otherwise, a suspended sentence or a sentence of
91. See generally United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Foster, 904 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sultani, 704 F.2d 132 (4th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
White, 529 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1976).
92. See generally United States v. Smith, 56 F.3d 66 (6th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1991); Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F.2d 269 (5th
Cir. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S. 895 (1973); Nash, 703 F. Supp. 507; People v.
Reichenbach, 587 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1998); State v. Hansen, 903 P.2d 194 (Mont. 1995);
State v. Sanchez, 612 P.2d 1332 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Layton City v. Longcrier, 943
P.2d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Griswold v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1996).
93. See Rudstein, supra note 51, at 549-50.
94. Id.
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probation would be both meaningless and ineffective, because it could
never be enforced.
Thus, is it possible to square the standard of a literal interpretation
of the Scott and Argersinger decisions-that no person convicted of a
misdemeanor suffers imprisonment who is not afforded the right to
counsel at trial-with the granting of a suspended sentence or conditional
probation? If suspended sentences or conditions of probation can never
be enforced, they cannot. The most reasonable solution, absent
completely overruling Argersinger and Scott, is to overrule them to the
extent that they deny counsel when imprisonment is an authorized
penalty, and interpret them to require that no person who is not afforded
the right to counsel at trial may be deprived of his or her liberty upon
conviction for a misdemeanor.
B. Argersinger and Scott Focus on Deprivations of Liberty
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "[no] State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."95 This clause is the avenue by which many of the
amendments in the Bill of Rights are applied to the states.96 Likewise,
the Sixth Amendment has been applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to
counsel has been deemed fundamental to due process.97 In Powell, the
Supreme Court was concerned with the word "life" in the Due Process
Clause, because it was a capital case. 98  Subsequent to the Powell
decision, the Supreme Court has consistently been concerned with an
individual's loss of liberty when deciding issues regarding a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 99
95. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
96. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight
amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action
by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among
them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal
prosecution.
Id. (citing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936)).
97. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at
344-46.
98. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case,
where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately
of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy,
or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law ....
Id.
99. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
It stands to reason that, although identifying a perceived bright-line
rule that no person shall be "actually imprisoned" without the assistance
of counsel, the sound principle in both Argersinger and Scott is really
that no person shall be "deprived of liberty" without the assistance of
counsel.100 The Court then identified one definite form of deprivation of
liberty as "actual imprisonment." To read Argersinger and Scott as being
concerned only with "actual imprisonment" would be not only to miss
the full meaning of these cases, but also to misapply long standing
Supreme Court precedent defining "liberty.'
10 1
In the Argersinger decision, the Court stated that it is not concerned
with situations "where loss of liberty is not involved."'' 0 2 Furthermore,
the Court often stressed the importance of situations "where an accused
is deprived of his liberty."'' 0 3 The Court also applied in its reasoning a
quote from Stevenson v. Holzman :104 "We hold that no person may be
deprived of his liberty who has been denied the assistance of
counsel.... . Even the last sentence of the Argersinger opinion states
how important it is that an individual's "liberty" not be taken without the
assistance of counsel.
0 6
The Scott decision also focused heavily on the deprivation of liberty
as the test for the application of the right to counsel. The Scott opinion
quotes approvingly the last sentence from the Argersinger opinion.'
°7
Like Argersinger, the Scott opinion often made references to cases
U.S. 367, 370 (1979); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343. "[The assistance of counsel] is one of the
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty.... The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that
if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done."' Id.
(citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
100. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. "The run of misdemeanors will not be affected
by today's ruling. But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty,
the accused will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so necessary where
one's liberty is in jeopardy." Id.; see also Scott, 440 U.S. at 370.
101. A deprivation of liberty exists when any restrictions are placed upon the
following activities: the right to travel, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965), the right of
privacy and freedom from governmental intrusion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 213 (1960), the right of free speech, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
51 (1988), the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460 (1958), and the fight to choose and follow an occupation or profession, In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 720 (1973).
102. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
103. See id. at 32.
104. 458 P.2d 414 (Ore. 1969).
105. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37-38 (citing Holzman, 458 P.2d at 418).
106. Id. at 40. The Court stressed that it is the loss of liberty with which it was
concerned: "But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the
accused will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so necessary when one's
liberty is in jeopardy." Id.
107. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 370.
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"where an accused is deprived of his liberty."'1 8  Even Chief Justice
Burger, in his opinion concurring in the result, stated that "any
deprivation of liberty is a serious matter."'
0 9
Thus, the Argersinger and Scott opinions show that the Court is
concerned with much more than just actual imprisonment. The Court is
concerned with deprivations of liberty in a broad context. The Court has
made a definite pronouncement that no defendant be deprived of liberty
where the defendant has not been afforded the right to counsel. The
Court merely identifies imprisonment as one form of such deprivation.
C. Probation and Suspended Sentences as Deprivations of Liberty
The concept of liberty in the American criminal justice system far
exceeds the single notion of actual imprisonment. In Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth,"0 the Supreme Court elaborated on its
interpretation of the concept of liberty as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty... guaranteed (by the Fourteenth Amendment).... [w]ithout
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized.., as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men. III
The Court further expressed its broad concept of liberty in Bolling v.
Sharpe:112 "'[L]iberty' ... is not confined to mere freedom from bodily
restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which
,,113the individual is free to pursue ....
When a defendant receives a suspended sentence or probation,
108. Id. at 373 (citing Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32).
109. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 41.
110. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
111. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see also
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). The Due Process Clause
guarantees more than fair process, and the "liberty" it protects includes more than the
absence of physical restraint. Further, the Court has held that the "liberty" specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399,
to enjoy marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and to use
contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
112. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
113. Id. at 499.
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restrictions are almost always placed on that person's liberty. Some of
the liberty restrictions placed on a person might include restrictions on
associating with or contacting certain people, 14 restrictions on Fourth
Amendment freedoms from unreasonable searches," 5 restrictions on the
freedom of travel by either having to stay in or away from a geographical
area,116 restrictions on political activities and free speech,'1 7 requirements
that an individual to submit to polygraph testing,118 restrictions on the
consumption of alcoholic beverages," 9 and restrictions on engaging in
certain professions or hobbies. 1
20
Thus, probationers suffer many varying restrictions on their liberty
as guaranteed by the Constitution. And, since it is clear that Argersinger
and Scott were more concerned with the deprivation of liberty as a whole
rather than simply actual imprisonment,' 2' then undoubtedly the concept
of liberty with which the Court was concerned is the same one described
in Meyer, Glucksberg, Roth, and Bolling. 1
22
D. Suspended Sentences Are Sentences to Terms of Imprisonment
When a court convicts an indigent defendant of a misdemeanor
without providing assistance of counsel and imposes a suspended
sentence or probation, the court is still giving the misdemeanant a
sentence of imprisonment. 123 The defendant is only given a chance to
serve the prison sentence outside the prison walls as long as certain
conditions are met. 124 When such a sentence is given, the probationer's
114. United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 559-60 (6th Cir. 1992).
115. United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) ("[Probationers] do not enjoy the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled.").
116. United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 1981).
117. United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995).
118. People v. Miller, 256 Cal. Rptr. 587, 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
119. Jent v. State, 495 So. 2d 123, 126 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
120. United States v. Brockway, 769 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1985).
121. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
123. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 266-67 (1943); see also Cooper v.
United States, 91 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1937).
The probation is not pardon, either absolute or conditional, for the power of
pardon is vested in the President. It is an authorized mode of mild and
ambulatory punishment, the probation being intended as a reforming discipline.
The probationer is not a free man, but is subject to surveillance, and to such
restrictions as the court may impose.
Id. at 199.
124. This is more applicable to those jurisdictions that allow for credit on the
suspended sentence for the time served on probation. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-38(c)
(1982); see Stephens v. State, 268 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) ("We hold,
therefore, that when a probationer is sentenced to serve time in a penal institution for the
offense for which he has spent time on probation, that probation time must be credited to
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freedoms are limited, and often subject to certain conditions.125  One
main difference between serving a prison sentence behind prison walls,
and serving a sentence outside the prison walls is that, in some
jurisdictions, with the imposition of a suspended sentence or the granting
of probation a convict receives no credit on the suspended sentence or for
time served on probation if either is revoked.126 The Supreme Court has
even stated in one of its opinions that a suspended sentence is
nonetheless a sentence to imprisonment. 27 There are also many state
court decisions that have made similar statements about suspended
sentences and probation. 1
28
In Argersinger, the Court makes reference to the American Bar
Association (ABA) Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, and
seemingly agrees with the ABA on drawing the line requiring the
assistance of counsel at those offenses that carry a "practical possibility"
of incarceration. 129  When defendants are given a suspended jail
any sentence received, including cases involving first offender probation."); see also
McKinney v. State, 525 S.E.2d 395, 399 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). In other jurisdictions, the
sentence remains in effect in its entirety until the probationary period is served. See
Wray v. State, 472 So. 2d 1119 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
[A] grant of probation does not reduce a sentence, but rather that the original
sentence which was suspended remains the same .... Since a grant of
probation does not reduce a sentence, it necessarily follows that the revocation
of probation does not increase a sentence .... Wray's original sentence of five
years remained the same throughout the trial court's actions regarding
probation.
Id. at 1121.
125. See Rudstein, supra note 51, at 547 n.144.
126. Hamilton v. State, 186 So. 2d 108, 114 (Ala. Ct. App. 1965); see also Persall v.
State, 16 So. 2d 332 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944). "[Probation] merely stops its execution for a
term only, it may be, or indefinitely, it may prove. It suspends not destroys[] ... [a]nd
upon condition broken, the sentence which has all along hung in its entirety over the
liberty of the.., convict is to be executed upon him." Id. at 334.
127. See Roberts, 320 U.S. at 267 ("Neither probation nor suspension of execution
rescinded the judgment sentencing petitioner to imprisonment .... ).
128. See Sutton v. State, 191 N.E.2d 104, 105-06 (Ind. 1963). "The term of
imprisonment which follows the revocation of probation is for the commission of the
offense with which the probationer stands convicted, and is not in any sense a
punishment for the violation of the terms of the probation." Id. (citing Bums v. United
States, 59 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1932), affd, 287 U.S. 216 (1932)); see State v. Aldape,
794 P.2d 672, 676 (Kan. 1990). "[Defendant] was under sentence from the beginning of
his probation but was given conditional liberty which could be revoked if he violated the
conditions of probation." Id.
129. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 39 (1972).
As a matter of sound judicial administration it is preferable to disregard the
characterization of the offense as felony, misdemeanor or traffic offense. Nor
is it adequate to require the provision of defense services for all offenses, which
carry a sentence to jail or prison. Often, as a practical matter, such sentences
are rarely if ever imposed for certain types of offenses, so that for all intents
and purposes the punishment they carry is at most a fine. Thus, the standard
seeks to distinguish those classes of cases in which there is real likelihood that
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sentence, there is certainly a "practical possibility" that they could be
incarcerated simply by revoking the suspended sentence. 13° Thus,
although it is questionable whether the reference to "types of offenses"'
' 31
encompasses probation and suspended sentences, such punishments
certainly come with the "practical possibility" of revocation, which often
results in imprisonment.
E. Incarceration Following the Revocation of Suspended Sentences or
Probation Amounts to Actual Imprisonment
Assuming, arguendo, that a sentence to probation is neither a
sentence to a term of imprisonment nor a deprivation of one's liberty,
Argersinger and Scott do not address the possibility of individuals being
actually imprisoned for violation of conditions of probation to which
they were sentenced without the assistance of counsel. Needless to say,
this is because the issue was not before the Court in either case.
Logically, if a defendant is sentenced to probation subject to conditions,
and those conditions are not met, the defendant can, and often will, be
incarcerated. What is illogical, however, is that a court can impose a
prison sentence for violations of a conditional suspended sentence or
sentences of probation if the defendant had no counsel at trial. 132 Simply
removing in time the implementation of the prison sentence does not
give it constitutional validity.
All too often, criminal misdemeanants are incarcerated following
the revocation of a suspended sentence or probation.' 33 Many times,
incarceration may follow conviction from those types in which there is no such
likelihood. It should be noted that the standard does not recommend a
determination of the need for counsel in terms of the facts of each particular
case; it draws a categorical line at those types of offenses for which
incarceration as a punishment is a practical possibility.
Id. (citing AM. BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES 40 (1968)).
130. See infra note 133.
131. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 39.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 703 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. La. 1989), affd, 886
F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1989). The district court determined that the defendant was not being
imprisoned for his original offense, but rather for violating the conditions of his
probation. The court reasoned that courts in general must retain the ability to enforce
compliance with the terms of probation, even if it means that the probationer serves time
in jail. Id.
133. On December 31, 2000, approximately 3,839,532 adults were under federal,
state, or local jurisdiction on probation. Among offenders on probation, 46% were for
misdemeanors (1,432,440). Of the total on probation, 40% (two out of five) violated a
condition of probation (1,535,812). Of these terminated probationers, 15% were returned
to jail or prison for violating conditions of probation (230,371). Admittedly, this figure
does not indicate how many of the re-incarcerated probationers were misdemeanor
probationers. However, if 46% of the total probationers were misdemeanants, then one
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probationers are given counsel at their probation revocation hearings. It
should be noted, however, that this is not always the case, and, further,
when counsel is given, it is neither a substitute for, nor does it remedy
the lack of assistance of, counsel at trial. 134 In Powell and Gideon, the
Court stated that, in order to assure a fair trial, the defendant must have
the "guiding hand" of counsel to assist in the defense.' 35  Thus, a
defendant who has counsel at a probation revocation hearing still did not
have the "guiding hand" of counsel present for the defense of the charges
that led to the conviction. And it is this prior uncounseled conviction
that will soon be the basis for incarceration when probation is revoked.
During a probation revocation hearing, probationers are in a very
different position than they were at the original criminal proceeding for
several reasons. 136 First, the standard of proof at a probation revocation
hearing is not necessarily the same as the reasonable doubt standard of
criminal proceedings. 137 Second, the formal rules of evidence generally
can estimate that approximately 46% of those re-incarcerated were misdemeanants as
well. Thus, approximately 100,000 misdemeanor probationers were re-incarcerated for
violating conditions of probation. See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, United
States Department of Justice, National Correctional Population Reaches New High-
Grows by 126,400 During 2000 To Total 6.5 Million Adults (Aug. 26, 2001), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/ppus00pr.htm.
134. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985).
[T]he final revocation of probation must be preceded by a hearing, although the
factfinding body need not be composed of judges or lawyers. The probationer
is entitled to written notice of the claimed violations of his probation;
disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person
and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body;
and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the
reasons for revoking probation.
Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973)).
135. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). "The run of misdemeanors
will not be affected by today's ruling. But in those that end up in the actual deprivation
of a person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel'
so necessary when one's liberty is in jeopardy." Id.; see Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963); see also Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
136. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781-89.
In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of
evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which
may be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a
presentation understandable to untrained jurors. In short, a criminal trial under
our system is an adversary proceeding with its own unique characteristics. In a
revocation hearing, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a
prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation described above; formal
procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the
hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or parole.
Id. at 789.
137. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 485 So. 2d 379, 381 (Ala. 1986). "IT]he State is not
bound to a standard of proof of reasonable doubt or the preponderance of the evidence;
rather, 'the State must submit enough substantive evidence to reasonably satisfy the trier
of the facts that a condition of probation was breached."' Id. (quoting Free v. State, 392
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do not apply at probation revocation hearings.138  And, finally,
probationers may have their probation revoked for committing another
offense even if they have not been convicted of the new offense at a
regular criminal trial. 3 9
Given the disadvantage to a probationer at a probation revocation
hearing, it can hardly be advocated that providing counsel at such a
hearing would satisfy the probationer's constitutional right to counsel.
Had the "guiding hand" of counsel been present at trial, the conviction,
suspended sentence, and subsequently the probation revocation hearing,
might have been avoided.
140
F. Argersinger Mandates a Judicial Pre-Trial Determination of
Sentences To Determine Whether Counsel Is Required
Argersinger mandates that judges make a pre-trial determination of
whether they will impose incarceration as a sentence before determining
whether they must provide counsel to the indigent defendant.' 41 Given
all the information available to judges, it is not difficult for them to
determine whether they will incarcerate a defendant subsequent to a valid
conviction. The case is not as simple with suspended sentences,
sentences to probation, and the possibility of their future revocation.
In order to satisfy the Argersinger and Scott requirement that
individuals cannot be incarcerated without the benefit of counsel for their
defense, judges would not only have to make a pretrial determination of
whether they are going to incarcerate the defendant, but they would also
have to know whether a defendant will be able to complete successfully a
suspended sentence or probationary period without revocation. It is
impossible, however, for a judge to predict whether a defendant will
successfully complete a term of probation in order to determine, in
So. 2d 857, 859 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980)).
138. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 689.
139. See Washington v. State, 577 So. 2d 473, 474 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). "[T]he
State may elect to prove the alleged subsequent offense as a basis for probation
revocation, and either pursue the prosecution of that offense at a later time or forgo its
prosecution altogether .... Thus, ... no final conviction is necessary for revoking
probation." Id. (citing Powell, 485 So. 2d at 381).
140. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36. "Misdemeanants represented by attorneys are
five times as likely to emerge from police court with all charges dismissed as are
defendants who face similar charges without counsel." Id.
141. See id at 40.
Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a
misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local
law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a
measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when
to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.
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advance of trial, whether to give a defendant counsel at trial. Further, if
a suspended sentence could never constitutionally be revoked unless
counsel was present at trial, then similarly a suspended sentence could
never be given unless counsel was provided. Otherwise, without the
authority to revoke, the sentence would be little more than an empty
threat by the court. 142
G. Economic Considerations and Strain on Public Resources
It is necessary to mention that a large part of why the Court limited
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Argersinger and Scott is the
economic burden that providing counsel in all cases where imprisonment
is an authorized penalty would have on the states.1 43 It is unfortunate that
the rights of individual misdemeanants are often ignored due to the large
volume of misdemeanor cases. 44 And, in some jurisdictions, although
counsel is constitutionally required, assistance of counsel is often not
given.145 Further, in jurisdictions that do provide counsel, the effective
assistance of counsel is often curtailed by inadequate funding 146 and
caseloads are often over-burdensome. 147 The same problem of lack of
funding exists in jurisdictions where courts appoint private counsel to
142. See United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648, 654 (10th Cir. 1991).
143. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating
that requiring all courts to provide counsel in all cases "often will be impossible or
impracticable-particularly in congested urban courts where scores of cases are heard in
a single sitting, and in small and rural communities where lawyers may not be
available").
144. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 34-35 (stating that the volume of misdemeanor
cases "may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the
result"); id. at 35 (noting that "the misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and
frequently irresponsible preparation") (quoting William E. Hellerstein, The Importance of
the Misdemeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 151, 152 (1970)).
145. See Richard Klein, Emperor Gideon Has.No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625,
657-63 (1986). A nationwide study of more than 3000 counties shows that:
The scope of representation provided for indigent defendants in many
jurisdictions does not meet the specific constitutional directives of the Supreme
Court.... Moreover the resources allocated to indigent defense services are
grossly deficient in light of the needs of adequate and effective representation.
Relatively few indigent defendants have the benefit of investigation and other
expert assistance in their defense. Their advocates are overburdened,
undertrained, and underpaid.
Id. (quoting Laurence A. Benner, Tokenism and the American Indigent: Some
Perspectives on Defense Services, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 667, 684-85 (1975)).
146. See id. at 658. "[Lack of funding] cripples the attempts of indigent defense
systems to provide truly effective representation." Id.
147. Id. at 660 (citing a Boston University study stating that the response to
Argersinger has been to assign additional cases to already overburdened public
defenders, with "the result being that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an empty
one for many defendants").
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represent indigent defendants. 148 As a result, misdemeanants in a public
defender system receive lawyers who are underpaid and overworked,
149
and private appointed attorneys who find themselves underpaid seek to
minimize their time spent on each case, and often plea bargain. 5°
Consequently, it appears at first blush that any expansion of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel will have additional detrimental effects on
an already overburdened system.
Evidence exists, however, that the burden on the court system and
the financial burden on the states may not be as severe as predicted by
the Justices in Argersinger and Scott.'5' At the time the Scott decision
was decided, thirty-three states would have given Scott an attorney.152
Thus, it appears that those states that do not provide counsel in all
situations where imprisonment is authorized do so because they are
unwilling, rather than unable, to do so.
Furthermore, the economic effect of applying the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to suspended sentences and probation would be far from
the catastrophe imagined in Argersinger153  The Argersinger
concurrence predicted that requiring local court systems to provide
counsel in all cases resulting in imprisonment could lead to "short term
chaos" and have long term adverse effects on the system. 54 However, in
Scott, Justice Rehnquist, who disagreed with the Argersinger rule,
admitted that "Argersinger has proved reasonably workable."'
' 55
Therefore, considering at least thirty-three states would have given
148. Id. at 658. "[Ilnadequate compensation pressures appointed counsel to plead
their cases out as quickly as possible." Id. Further, in some areas of the country,
"indigent defendants [are] not provided competent counsel, and that indigent defendants
face[] injustices because of their poverty." Id.
149. See id. at 657-63.
150. Id.
151. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 58-62 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 373-74 (1979).
152. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "In fact, Scott would be
entitled to appointed counsel under the current laws of at least 33 States." Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting). "The actual figure may be closer to 40 States. [Seven] States appear to be
governed only by the 'likelihood of imprisonment' standard." Id. at 388 n.22 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
153. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 58-62 (Powell, J., concurring in result). In a
concurrence joined by Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell predicted that the rule would
result in increased costs to the public and added delay and congestion in the courts.
It is undoubtedly true that some injustices result from the informal procedures
of these local courts when counsel is not furnished. . . . But to require that
counsel be furnished virtually every indigent charged with an imprisonable
offense would be a practical impossibility for many small town courts. The
community could simply not enforce its own laws.
Id. at 61 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
154. Id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring in result).
155. See Scott. 440 U.S. at 373.
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Scott counsel, and the unreliability of the speculative economic effects
predicted by the Justices in Argersinger and Scott, there is no reason to
assume that an extension of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
suspended sentences would have detrimental economic effects.
Further, given the importance of the constitutional implications of
effective representation at trial, economic considerations certainly cannot
be an overriding concern.156 Justice Brennan evidenced this by stating
that the Supreme Court's "role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for
criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary
decisions of state governments. 1 57  Thus, economic concerns are
irrelevant when weighed against constitutional privileges.
1 58
Further evidence shows that many jurisdictions that do not provide
effective assistance of counsel to indigent defendants clearly have the
resources to do so. 159 For example, the states allocate approximately four
times the amount of money to prosecution offices than they allocate to
indigent defense offices. 16  In order to ensure a fair trial, states must
reduce this disparity, and further allocate the resources to providing
defense counsel for indigent defendants in proceedings that will result in
a suspended sentence or probation.'
6'
IV. Conclusion
The Argersinger and Scott decisions are flawed to the extent that
they fail to take into account the possibility of actual imprisonment
stemming from an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction that resulted in
a suspended sentence or probation that has subsequently been revoked.
Further, lower courts are interpreting and applying the Argersinger and
Scott decisions in two distinctly opposite ways. Some courts recognize
that it is a nullity to give a suspended sentence or a sentence to probation
without providing counsel at trial, because the court can then never
revoke such a sentence, and therefore cannot enforce its own sentence.
156. See id. at 384 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The invidiousness of the discrimination
that exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not
erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal
interest is, therefore, irrelevant." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). "The invidiousness of the
discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those who
can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed." Id. at
197.
159. See Klein, supra note 145, at 675. "[O]n a per capita basis, indigent defense
spending nationwide represents less than three percent of all justice spending." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 676. "[I]f one expects the confrontation between adversaries to lead to a
reliable determination by the factfinder, each side must be relatively balanced in assets,
time, and assistance." Id.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Other courts have no problem labeling the imprisonment resulting from
the revocation of probation as a violation of the conditions of the
probation, rather than for the original offense. The latter, however, fail
to see that the revocation would not have happened but for the
uncounseled conviction.' 62 Finally, the Argersinger and Scott decisions
were more concerned with deprivations of liberty rather than simply
actual imprisonment.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court recognized as unsound the rule
established in Betts v. Brady, which required a case-by-case analysis of
whether counsel must be provided.163 Argersinger and Scott essentially
create the same rule for misdemeanors. Judges are required to determine
on a case-by-case basis whether counsel must be provided for an indigent
defendant before a trial begins.1 64  This rule is as unsound for
misdemeanor trials as it is for felony trials. Further, many states have
recognized that providing counsel in all misdemeanor cases where
imprisonment is an authorized punishment is more workable in practice
with respect to current sentencing practices. 65 Thus, the best solution,
that is both practical and fiscally achievable, while sufficiently protecting
the constitutional rights of indigent defendants, is to raise the floor of
constitutional minimum protection by requiring the assistance of counsel
in all criminal prosecutions where imprisonment is an authorized
punishment. 
166
162. See Rudstein, supra note 51, at 549-50.
163. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942).
164. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a
misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local
law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a
measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when
to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.
Id.
165. See Scott, 440 U.S. 367, 388 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "In fact, Scott
would be entitled to appointed counsel under the current laws of at least 33 States." Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). "The actual figure may be closer to 40 States. [Seven] States
appear to be governed only by the 'likelihood of imprisonment' standard." Id. at 388
n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. It must be noted that the United States Supreme Court visited this issue on May
20, 2002, and, although making a step in the right direction, fell considerably short of the
solution proposed in this comment. See Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764 (2002). In
a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit
activation of a suspended sentence upon the defendant's violation of the terms of
probation unless the defendant was accorded the "guiding hand" of counsel at trial. Id. at
1770. The Court stated that a suspended sentence is considered "actual imprisonment"
within the meaning of Argersinger and Scott, because it results in a loss of liberty, and
that the imprisonment resulting from the revocation of a suspended sentence is for the
underlying offense, not for violating the terms of the probation. Id. Although appearing
to resolve the issue satisfactorily, the Court limited its decision to only those states that
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provide minimum, or inadequate procedural safeguards at probation revocation hearings.
Id. at 1773 n.5. The opinion seems to suggest that, although providing counsel at a
revocation hearing is no substitute for denying counsel at trial, it may be a substitute if
the revocation hearing is a retrial of the original offense, or if adequate constitutional
safeguards are given at the revocation hearing. Id. The Court, however, refused to define
what constitutes adequate protections and also stated that it limited its review to the case
presented to the Alabama Supreme Court and gave deference to that court's decision. Id.
at 1775. The Court, thus, expanded the definition of "actual imprisonment" to include
the revocation of probation and suspended sentences, but fell slightly short of
establishing a simpler and more workable rule requiring the assistance of counsel in all
criminal prosecutions where imprisonment is an authorized penalty.

